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Donald A. Carter. Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe,
1951-1962 (U.S. Army in the Cold War). Washington, D.C.: Centre
of Military History, United States Army, 2015. Pp. 535.
At the start of 1951, the United States Army’s presence in Europe
consisted primarily of constabulary units engaged in occupation
duties in the former territories of the Axis powers. Eleven years
later, the US army had five divisions in West Germany positioned
to confront a possible invasion by Soviet forces. The story of this
transformation is at the heart of Donald A. Carter’s book, Forging
the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951-1962. A volume in
the US Army’s official history of its forces in the Cold War era,
it describes the evolution of the Army’s role during this period,
detailing the ways it adapted as its leaders strove to fulfill a new
mission of superpower confrontation.
Carter begins by detailing the scope of the Army’s challenge at
the start of the 1950s, which involved a complete reversal of policy. In
the aftermath of the Second World War, the aim of American officials
was to end the US military’s presence in the European theater, which
was concentrated in three regions: southern Germany, Austria and
the city of Trieste. The growing confrontation with the Soviet Union
forced a reevaluation of this goal, with US forces shifting back towards
combat preparation even as sovereignty was restored to the Germans
in the American-, British- and French-controlled occupation zones.
After the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949, however,
the US Army faced a new mission to defend western Europe against
a possible Soviet invasion and this required a far larger military
presence than was already in place. A key step in this process was the
reactivation of the Seventh Army in November 1950, which assumed
control over organisation, training and operations for all US Army
units stationed in Europe.
Seventh Army’s tasks were considerable and Carter spends
much of the early chapters of his book detailing their scope.
Foremost among them was the building of a new combat-ready
force in a foreign territory. Though the Pentagon soon transferred
four divisions to Europe, these units had to be housed, supplied
and trained for combat. Carter details these challenges at length,
chronicling the gradual emergence of the Communications Zone
(ComZ)—a logistical network that connected US forces in southern
Germany to ports in France—as well as the development of housing
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and other facilities for the troops. Adding to the challenge was the
restoration of German sovereignty and the incorporation of West
Germany into NATO as an equal partner. While these moves were
key to shifting some of the defence burden to the West Germans,
they reduced the latitude the Americans had enjoyed during the
occupation period while increasing competition for the use of the
already limited training ranges in the country. Though the units of
Seventh Army enjoyed a considerable leavening of combat veterans
from the Second World War and the Korean War, the constant influx
of draftees ensured a regular need for training beyond what they
received during their induction. This was especially true considering
the forward position of most Seventh Army units, some of which
were stationed within minutes of the border with East Germany. If
war broke out, the opportunities for those soldiers to learn the art
of war as they went along would be brief.
Complicating matters further was the election of Dwight D.
Eisenhower as president in 1952. Though a career army officer,
Eisenhower believed that a strong economy was vital to national
security. To that end, his “New Look” strategy called for a greater
reliance upon airpower and atomic weapons in order to reduce
defence spending. As Carter explains in Chapter Three, for the
Seventh Army, this meant incorporating atomic weapons into their
planning. Carter identifies this as a significant factor in the evolution
of the US Army in the early Cold War period. The Army and the
Air Force had divergent ideas as to how such weapons might be
deployed, and so the Army sought to reduce its dependence upon the
Air Force to deliver atomic weapons. Such a change would allow for
greater control over their use in a battlefield situation. For much of
the period, the Army relied heavily upon ungainly 280-mm cannons
as their primary means of deploying atomic weapons, subsequently
supplementing them with intermediate-range missiles and even the
infamous Davy Crockett short-range system. Budgetary pressure
and the idea of an atomic battlefield also drove a reorganisation of
divisions into a new “pentomic” structure, the effects of which on
the Seventh Army Carter details in the later chapters of his book.
The brainchild of the Army Chief of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor,
the replacement of the three-regiment triangular division with one
consisting of five “battle groups” of 1,356 men proved unworkable and
was phased out in the early 1960s with the advent of the Kennedy
Administration’s “flexible response” doctrine.
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As the Seventh Army adapted to the uncertain demands of
warfare in the atomic era, they also adjusted to the previously
unfamiliar circumstances of long-term peacetime deployments
abroad. Carter devotes a considerable amount of space in chapters
Three, Eight and Ten to describing the problems faced by the Army
in maintaining men abroad, addressing everything from their housing
to morale. Drawing upon the work of such scholars as Donna Alvah,
Anni Baker and Maria Hohn, as well as the contemporary accounts
in news publications such as Stars and Stripes and Army Times,
he recounts what life was like for these young American men, most
of whom had not traveled much within their own country much less
to a foreign one.1 As Carter relates, despite occasional controversies
the locals welcomed them for the protection their presence provided
and for the money they spent in their communities. In turn, the
soldiers often served as unofficial ambassadors, reconciling many
West Germans to the continued presence of American forces and
sometimes establishing enduring relationships that testified to the
goodwill between two peoples who had been at war with each other
just a few years before.
By the end of the period, Carter concludes, the United States
Army, Europe (USAREUR) “had achieved almost all of the goals
that service leaders had set for it more than ten years earlier” (p.
465). The same could be said for the official history of their effort.
Based on an impressive range of official histories, archival records,
contemporary reporting and scholarly monographs regarding defence
policy and social history, Carter’s book offers a history of the US
Army’s early Cold War engagement with the Soviet challenge that
is lucidly written and clearly argued. His incorporation of the social
history of the forces into his account is especially welcome, as it
highlights an important aspect of the history of the Army that is
all too often overlooked in official histories, such as the volumes on
the US Army’s contemporary operations in the Korean War. Yet
Carter’s focus is primarily upon the units and operations in West
Germany. The ComZ organisation is discussed mainly in the context
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of developing logistical support for the Seventh Army and the
contingents in Austria and Trieste are addressed only in passing.
Undoubtedly this reflects the primary mission of USAREUR during
this period and the location of most of the Army’s forces in the
region, but it has the effect of leaving out parts of the history of
the US Army in Europe from a volume ostensibly dedicated to just
that. This omission is especially unfortunate considering the quality
and comprehensiveness of Carter’s scholarship in every other respect.
With its coverage of everything from the Army’s role during the
Berlin Crisis to Elvis Presley’s time as a soldier in a tank battalion,
it is a model of official history, one that will endure as a resource
for anyone interested in learning about the main focus of US Army
operations during a critical period of the Cold War.
mark klobas , scottsdale community college

